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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al,
\
Appellant, (

vs.
vm.GINIA CLARE JOHNSON,
Respondent.

DOCKET
) NO. 9874

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STA~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action by plaintiff, for herself and as guardian of her minor children, for damages for the wrongful
death of her husband and father of the children, who was
killed while in the process of removing a disa;bled motor
vehicle and trailer from the highway when defendant drove
a motor vehicle against the trailer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From the verdict and
judgment for defendant and from the denial by the Court
of plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. and/or a new
trial plaintiff appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment entered, and
judgment as to liability in her favor as a matter of law, or
that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about H:30 p. m.. on the evooing of June 13, 1961,
Don R. Miln&, with his wife and daughter, was driving
North on Highway U-28 between Gunnison and Levan,
Utah (Tr. 6, 7). Milner was driving a 1952 Ohevrolet car
and was pulling a two-wheel single axle trailer that he had
made, (Tr. 9), when he struck a deer on the Highway and
broke the rear axle on his car. After the impact with the
deer, the Milner car and trailer came to rest, facing North,
within a few feet of the white line marking the East edge
of the Highway and about paTallel with that line (Tr. 9).
The accident occurred near the bottom of a general
dip, which is approximately one mile wide (Tr. 131). A
car approaching from the South would be on a slight downgrade and would have clear and nnobstructed view for onehalf mile (Tr. 131). The road is straight and was in good
eondition on the night of the accident (Tr. 131). The highway had been· recently resurfaced with asphalt and was
37 feet wide (Tr. 13,2). The East half of the roadway
(Nrr.cthbound) was 19 feet 2 inches wide and the West half
(Southbound) is 17 feet 10 inches wide (Tr. 138). The
speed limit at night was 50 miles per hour (Tr. 131). The
investigating officer coruld not place the Milner vehicles by
exact· measurement, where they first came to rest, because
they removed the Milner car and the wrecker before they
made any· measure1nents (Tr. 133).
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After hitting the deer, Mr. Milner, with his flashlight,
flagged dorwn a car approaJching from the South and the
car stopped some distance South of the Milner vehicle (Tr.
10). That automobile was driven by Everett Kester and
he was accompanied by his wife, his wife's sisteT, and four
children (Tr. 47). Mr. Kester then pulled his car to the
left around the Milner vehicle and stopped some distance
to the North of the Milner vehicle, off the East. shouldeT
of the road (Tr. 49 and Ex. 4). Kester and Milner were
acquaintances and Mr. Kester examined Milner's car ·and
they both decided that the only way to move it would be
to get a wrecker (Tr. 50).
At that time another vehicle was approaching from
the South and J.\!Iilner flagged it down and asked the occupants to send out a wrecker, which they agreed to do (Tr.
50). About one-half hour ·later (Tr. 50), the wrecker,
driven by James WarneT Tayor, plaintiff's decedent, came
out from Levan and pulled off the road 00. the ·west side
of the highway a short distance to the South of the Milner
vehicle (Tr. 12, 51). The wrecker operator gort out of his
wrecker, looked the situation over, and· they all agreed
that the Milner car would have to be lifted and towed from
its rear (Tr. 13) . Milner asked Kester if he would pull the
trailer in and Kester agreed to do so (Tr. 52). Milner unhitched the trailer and they moved .the trailer to the shoulder on the East side of the road (Tr. 13). Its actual position on the side of the road was illustrated by the varioiUS
witnesses as T. 2 on Exhibits 3, 4, and 5.
After the
trailer had been morved, Milner rem01ved the trailer hitch
from his ear, (Tr. 14), and the wrecker operator moved
the wreckeT into position to pick up the Milner car (Tr.
13). While the wrecker operat01r was attaching the Mil-
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ner vehicle to. the wrecker, Milner and Kester were placing
the trailer hitch on the Kester car, which had been backed
up to a position in front of the trailer (Tr. 14, 15).
Milner and Kester could not tighten the trailer hitch
on Kester's car because they did not have the dght kind
of wrench. As the wrecker opevator completed hoisting
the Milner car, Milner asked him to bring a socket wrench
to tighten the trailer :hitch boJts (Tr. 16). The deceased,
on the West side of 1Jhe rtoogue otf the trailer, was leaning
over tightening the trailer hitch (Tr. 16, 17), when the
oollisioo whlch tooik his life occurred (Tr. 53.). Plaintiff's
decedent had been so engaged for "a couple of minutes"
(Tr. 24).
At the time of the collision the wrecker was standing
on the East half of the roadway, facing SOuth and the rear
end of the· Milner car was attached to the w~ecker lift and
was hoisted off the ground ('I.r. 6). The wrecke1r lights
were on low beam, an amber light on each fro!Illt fender
of the wrecker was flashing yellow; and a large blue light
on top of the cab of the wrecker was oscillating. In addition, there were a number of other lights on the wrecker,
including a flood light that. was shining on the Milner car
(Tr.. 17, 37, 129). The lights on the Milner car were on,
the lights on th.e Kester car were on and there were four
flashlights on the scene, all of which were burning (Tr. 17).
The .Milner trailer had two red reflectors mounted one on
each side of the tailgate. These reflecto['s were 3 to 4
inches in diameter (Tr. 10, 56).

After the wrecker arrived at the scene and while it

was . in

rpl~ce

.on the East half of the roadway lifting the

MUner car, a .number of orther vehicles approached from the
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South, all of which. would slow down and pass on the West
half of the :voadway (Tr. 19, 57, 85).
Defendant, driving a 1959 Pontiac, was traveling North
As she approached the scene of the accident
there was nothing that obsCUTed her view of the highway
(Tr. 188). She could see ahead of hex for one.Jhalf mile
(Tr. 196). .At a point one-half mile North of the place of
the accident (Tr. 196), she saw the lights, including the
blue revoJving light and recognized it as, a ~ecker (Tr.
188). When she first saw the wreckeT ·she wondered if
there was an accident on the road (Tr. 189). As defendant approached the scene orf the accident th~ were no
other cars coming behind her or from the North (Tr. 196).
According to the defendant she was traveling "just right
around 60" (Tr. 194). When she gort fairly close to the
wrecker, it "dawned" on her that the wrecker ·was OlVer
the white line on her side of the road (Tr. 189). She did
nothing with respect to braking or slowing down her car
until she got to a ~int right in front of the wrecker, where
she either had to "hit the wrecker or go around it to the
right", and· at that time all she did was take her foot off the
gas (Tr. 198). Part of defendant's testimony on cross-examination -was as foHows: (Tr. 198)
(Tr. 187).

"Q.
All right, Miss Johnson, lets see if I understand your testimony. At a time when you were approximately a half-mile South of where the impact
ocCUITed, you could see a vehicle ahead of yoo with
head lights and with a blue light which you at that
point recognized .1Jo be a wrecker?
A. That's right.
Q. Yoru did nothing with respect to braking or
slowing down your car until you got to a podnt right
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in front of it where you either had ito hi:t it or go around
it to the righrt, is that cocrect?

A.
Q.
foot off
A.

That's correct.
And at that time all you did was to take your
the gas?
That's right."

The defendant struck the trailer pushing it into the
Kester automobile and the impact pushed both o1i those
vehicles forward 76 feert 4 inches (Tr. 134). Plaintiff's decedent, James Wamoc 'Taylor, was killed by this impact.
Witness, Mrs. Kester, first observed the headlights of the
defendant's ear when it was alborut seven-tenths of a mile
away (Tr. 87). The ear was oonstantly in her view (Tr.
91), and she estimated defendant's speed as between 70
and 80 miles per hour (Tr. 93).
The following diagram, appellants think, fairly dep[cts
the respective vehicles on the roadway at the time of the

collision.
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Alt the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff moved the
Court for a di,rected veroict for the plaintiff, submitting
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to the jury only the question ·of damages. The Court took
the motion under advisement (Tr. 206). After the jury
returned, plaintiff moved the Court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the COurt also tooik under advisement (Tr. 235). Thereafter plaintiff filed written motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the
alternative, for a new trial (R. 11). All of these motions
were denied by the Court (R. 27).
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL

1. The evidence shows, as a matter of law, that defendant was negligent and that her negligence was an intervening, independent sole proximate 'cause of the acci~
dent.
2. That the plaintiff's decedent was not guilty of any
contributory negligence.
That even if he was, such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.
3. The Court erred in instructions given to the jucy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

TH!E DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND HErR NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT, INTERVENING, SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION.
Plaintiff's decedent, James Warner Taylor, was on a
rescue mission. The Milner car and trailer were immobile
and the car could oruy be to!Wed by lifting it from the rear.
The wrecker was in position to hoist that vehicle. The
wrecker headlights were on 1ow beam; a flashing yellow
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light was mounted on each of its front fenders and a large
blue light atop its cab was oscillating. The headlights on
the Milner car were on. The headlights on the Kester car
were on. A floodlight on the hoisting portion of the wreckeT
was on. In additiorn thereto, there were at least folW' flashlights at the scene. !Defendant, traveling Nor1Jh, oibseTved
the lights ahead of her at a time when she was orne-half
mile away and, at that time, recognized that one of the
vehicles was a wrecker. She thought there might be an
accident up ahead but, nevertheless, continued traveling,
by her own admission, at a speed of 60 miles per hour and
did nothing whatsoever by way of slowing her vehicle to
bring it under oontrol so as to be aJble to avoid the collisio!ll.
When she got so dose to the vehicles upon the roadway
that she had to "hit the wrecker head-on, or turn to the
right'', she merely took her ~oot off the gas and turned
right.
The negligence of the defendant in traveling at a speed
greater than the speed limit and in failing to slorw dorwn
her car or to bring the same under e0!11trol after she ob·
served the warning lights on the vehicles on the roadway
one-half mile in front of her, rende~rs her guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and her later negligence is an
independent, intervening, sole proximate cause of the accident in question. Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products, Utah
2nd 143, 263 Pacific 2nd 287; McMurdie vs. Underwood,
9 Utah 2nd 400, 346 Pacific 2nd 711; Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2nd 379, 366 Pacific 2nd 989.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS NOT GUILTY OF
ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, HOWEVER,
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EVEN IF HE HAD, BEEN NEGLIGENT, SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS Norr A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
AOCIDENT.
The plaintiff's decedent was removing the vehicles
from the road and rshoulder thereof. His wrecker was well
equipped with numerous warning devices, all of which were
on and functioning, and which gave warning in all direetions for a great distance. When he arrived at the scene,
rthe wrecker operator detffi'mined thaJt the Milner car would
have to be hoisted from its rear and that he oould not tow
both of the immobile vehicles, that is, both the automobile
and the trailffi'. Mr. Kester offered to pull the trailer :in.
Mr. Milner and Mr. Kester removed the trailer hitch from
the Milner car and were in the process of placing the same
on the Kester car so that the trailer could be affixed to it.
As the decedent finished hoisting the Milner ear he was
asked rby Mr. Milner if he (decedent) had a socket wrench
that would tighten the trailer hitch. He secured a wrench
from his wrecker and morved to a position between the
Kester automobiie and the trailer for the purpose of tightening the bolt. While so engaged. it was necessary that
he devorte some time to that which he was doing and it
wa:s nort reasonable to expect that he could have been ·as
vigilant aborut his own safety as oibhe[" people who happened
to be on or about a road and are nort so occupied. Reid
vs. Owen (Utah) 93 Pacific 2nd 680.
Inasmu~h

as the defendant admitted that she saw the
vehicle at a time when she was one-half mile away, and,
by its warning devises, recognized it to be a wrecker, it
seems extremely unlikely that any failure to plarce flares
would be of any -consequence. As pointed out by the Court
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in Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, supra, "If 1Jhere had
been flares out, or even if the 1Jruck had been aflame, it

·could have given (her) no more inform.ation".
After ·the wrecker had pulled into position to hoist the
Milner ear and previous rto the arrival on the scene by the
defendant herem, a number of vehicles had approached
from the South. All of 1Jhose drivers were able to bring
their ear under control and could and did approach cautiously and pass on arormd on the W·est half of the highway without any difficulty whatever (Tr. 19, 57, 85).
Defendant argues that the plaintiff's decedent, after
attaching the Milner automobile to the wrecker, had time
to remo~e those vehicles off the main rtraveled portion of
·the highway and that his failure ro do so was negligence
which ronrtributed to the •accident in question. That positioo ignores the fact fuat there were two vehicles to be
removed, the automobile and the trailer. Further, it loses
sight of the fact that the trailer was not connected to 1Jhe
Kester C8!I' and was the.refbre not lighted. To require 1Jhe
decedent or Milner or Kester to work hitching ·the trailer
without the protection of the wrecker warning lights, would,
in essence, be saying that it is more dangerous to leave a
warning light on the road than it was to leave an unlighted
vehicle. Hirschback vs. Dubuque Packing Company 7 Utah
2nd 7, 216 Bacific (2) 319.
As ·pointed out by the Court in Ve~asquez vs. Greyhotrod Lines, Inc., supra, the problem of controlling importance o.n thls appeal is: Was fue negligence of the defendant in failing to slow dOIWil or to bring her car under cont~ol after slhe saw the wrecker, the sole proximate cause
of the plaintiff's decedent's death, or was the prior parking
of the wrecker on the highway, partially obstructing the
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Northbound traffic lane, also a concurring proximate cause
thereof. The claimed contributory negligence 0111 the part
of plaintiff's decedent was, one; his alleged failure to place
flares upon fue highway and, two; the interval of time
which amounted to approximately three (3) ·minutes which
was used by him, afteT ·he hoisted the Milner vehicle with
the wrecker, to tighten the trailer hitch on the Kesrter car.
As far as the flal"es are concerned the defendant admitted
having seen the warning lights and tJo have reoogniz·ed that
it was a wrecker, at a time when she was one. .half mile
away. By seeing and recognizing fuat light and by seeing
the other lights which she could have seen had s:he been
olbservant, she had all of the warning that any possi!ble
signals could have given her. The second contention, that
is, that the time utilized bY' decedent, a three minute interval, used to tighten fue trailer hitch, was a proximate: cause
of the accident, is simply saying that if the vehicles had not
been on the road an accident would not have happened.
POINT

m

THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN
TO THE JURY.
The instructions given by the Corurt to the jury, a;bout
46 in number, are in some instances contradictory and in
other respects serve to over-emphasize particular aspects of
the case; to perrn.it the jury to specu[ate; are indefinite; and,
were prejudicial to the plaintiff.
A.Jppellant's position is that the~ defendant was guilty OJf
negligence as a matter olf law. Also, that the negligence
of the defendant in failing to bring her car under ~control or
stop after she saw the warning lights and recognized
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that the vehicle was a wrecker, at a time when she was
approximately one-half mile away from the scene o!f the
accident, and had ample ·time to do so, was an independent,
intervening sole proximate 1cause of the accident. Appellant took the position that the only question which should
have been submitted to tile jury was the question of damages. A Motion for Directed Verdict for the plaintiff, submitting the question o!f damages to the jury, was made by
the plaintiff at the conclusion of the trial (Tr. 206). Upon
denial of that motion by the Court, and aftoc an indication
from the Court that he intended to submit the case to the
jury in all of its ramifications, and, after the Court had
instructed the jury, the plaintiff excepted to the following
instructions which the O>urrt failed to give and to the following instructions which the plaintiff claims were erroneously given by the Court.
A. By i1:Js requested instruction No. 3, the plaintiff
ask for an instruction in the_ nature of the last clear
chance. T:his instruction was premised upon the admission by the defendant that she saw the lights of the wrecker
at a tjme when she was approximately one-half mile away
and that at that time she thought there might be an aJccident on the road, horwever, that she continued toward the
wrecker at a great and excessive speed, without slowing
her oar by appl~cation of braikes or otheTWise, until she
was a few feert from the wrecker. She also admitted that
it "dawned" on her that she had to hit the wrecker or
turn to the right and, that s1he could not see ahead of the
lights that were.on the wrecker, but, that even so, it was
her intention to go around that vehicle. The plaintiff rea~
soned that she therefore had the last clear chance to avoid
the accident and in these 'Circumstances. any act of negli-
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1 ...,

gence on the part of plaintiff's decedent, 1lhat is on the part
of James Warner Taylor, would nOit bar recovery by the
plaintiff. This request was supported by the cases of Barnett vs. U. S. (1948) 78 Fed. Supp. 186 and by Fox vs Taylor (Utah) 10 Utah 2nd 174.
B. Plaintiff ~cepted to instructions Nos. 19, 20, 21,
and 22 as. given by the Court.
This series of instrructions deals with the problems of
blinding lights, reaction time, anticipation of danger, and
sudden and. une~ed peril. In other words, in substance
and effect, with emergency situations. Although these
matters were daimed. by the defendant as part of her th~
ory O!t' the case, there is no evidence whatever in the record to support any such instructiorn. The defendant ~Saw
the warning lights of the wrecker and thought theTe might
be an automobile accident up the road at a time when she
was one-half mile away. She proceeded on at am excessive
speed without in any manner slowing her car or attempting to bring it under control until she had reached a pomt
where, according to her, she either had to hit the wrecker
head-on or turn to the right. If the defendant was COII1fronted with amy emergency in this case, it was an emergency of her own ·choosing or of her own making, and. was
not an emergency created by the action of anyorne else.
In that event, she would not be entitled to any such instruction.
Instruction No. 19, deals with the "blinding" by the
headlights of oncoming vehicles and the obscuring of objects behind it by reason thereof. The <mly moving vehicle
here was the vehicle driven and propelled by the defendant. There is no evidence whatever that there was any
sudden bright lights or any other blinding lights. This
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instruction finds absolutely no factual support in the record, is contrary to the evidence, and is prejudicial to the
plaintiff.
Instruction No. 20, deals with the problem of reacting
instantaneously upon seeing danger and w1th reaction time.
Here again, fue instruction finds no support from a factual
basis on any testimony in the transcript of evidence. The
warning lights on the wrecker were clearly ·visible to the
defendant for a long distance and she did in fact see the
warnin·g lights at· a time when she was one-half mile removed from the scene m the accident. She saw the danger timely, but she failed and neglected to slow her car
or to bring the same under.,control so that sthe would be able
to meet the situation on the roadway ahead of her. She
was nort entitled to the instruction and ~the instruction was
prejudicial to the plaintiff.
By instructioo No. 21, the jury was told that the defendant was not required to anticipate or guard against anything which oould not reasonably be e~ted. The jury
were Turther told that if the defendant could not, in the
exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the collision, then
the plaintiff could not recover. This instruction is clearly
erroneous and is nort supported by any facts whatever in
the transcript. After she had admitted seeing the warrrlng
signals, timely, the effect of this instruction could only be
to lead the jury to bel,ieve that it was required that she see
the exact nature of the danger up the road. In the circumstances of this case such instruction is erroneous and
prejudicial to the plaintiff
_Instructioo No. 22 deals with sudden and unexpected
pe·ril. .Had the defendant turned around a oorner or come
over the erest of a hill and been suddenly eonfronted with
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a situation which, at her then speed, she could not. stop her
automobile, the above instruction may have ben proper.
In this instance the defendant saw the situation on the roadway ahead o!f her, at a time when she wa:s one-half mile
away, and heedlessly continued on at a great and excessive
speed without materially slowing or bringing her oar under
control until it was too late so to do. This instruction is
not supported hy any evidence in the transcript, is contrary
to the evidence in the record, and is prejudicial to the plaintiff and pernrlts the jury to speculate.
C. Plailn.tiff ~cepted to instructions Nos. 30, 33, and
34 as given by the Court.
These three instructions, in substance and effoot, deal
with the duty to warn and to place flares or other warning
devices upon the roadway. The record is clear. and uncontroverted that the wrecker was equipped with a blue oscillating light on the top of its cab, with amber flashing lights
on each of its front fenders, a floodlight on the hoi:ster, and
other lights mounted about the body of the wrecker, all of
which were in operation and btllrn.ing as the defendant approached the scene. In addition the lights oo the Milner
car were bUT'Iling, the lights on the Kester car were burning,
and there were four flashlights, all burning, aJbout the scene.
The transcript is also clear that the defendant observed the
warning signals; that she thought there might be an accident up the voad, but that nevertheless, she oonrtinued on
at an e~cessive speed without even slowing herr oar or bringing the ~same under eontrol so that :she comd stop if necessary to avo~d a eotlision.
Instruction No. 30, among ortheii' things, tells the jury
that if there were no flares or orther warning signals placed
on the highway to warn motorists approaching from the
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South, then ·the jury could find James W. Taylor was negligent and the plaintiff could not recover if such lack of reasonable care was a iFOximarte cause of the collision. This
instruction was nort supported by any evidence whatever in
the transcript. The record is clear thart the defendant saw
the warning signal. The warning lights which the defendant saw should have warned her that there was an object
in front which would have to be avoided and she should
have driven in such a manner and at such a rate of speed
that she coruld have avoided a collision at any time, Hirschbach vs. Dubuque Packing Compall1y, supra. Moreover,
the instruction does nort say whose duty it was to place
additional flares or wheTe such additional flares should
have been p[aced, and leaves the matter to the speculation
of the jury. In addition theTeto, the instruction conflicts
with another instruction given by the Co!UI'It, No. 25, which,
in part, tells the jury that they could not find decedent
negligent merely because of failing to place the flares on
the road if the wrecker was equipped with warning lights
on its top and was then 'be.ing used to remove a stalled vehicle from the highway. The instruction ,as given by the
Court in No. 30, was improper; was not a correct statement
of the law; is not supported by amy factual evidence, and
was prejudicial to the plaintiff.
By instruction No. 33, the jury were again told that
the failure to warn approaching traffic of the obstruction
by lights, flags, guards O[' other twactical means, may coo- ·•
stitute negligence on the part of the wrecker operator.
This instruction does not even require that such negligence,
if any, he a proximate cause of the collision. What we
have· said above with respect to instruction No. 30, is, we
think, equally applicable to instruction No. 33.
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By instruction No. 34, the jury were told that if they
found that the decedent did not use ordinary care a.~d diligence to warn oncoming morto['ists of t!he obstruction, then
they should ~eturn a vermct for the defendant and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action. Like instruction No. 30
and 33 hereinabove mentioned, this instruction is erroneous
and prejud1!cial to the plaintiff, because defendant admitted seeing the warning signals.

The cumulative effect of the four instructions hereinabove mentioned dealing, in substance and effect, with sudden emergency, and the wee instructions hereina;boiVe mentioned deaJling with the :flailure to warn or to place flares,
is to greatly overr-emphasize those aspects of the case. They
permit the jury to speculate, in some instances they are in
conflict with other instructions given by the Court and
their effect is highly prejudicial to the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION

The Trial Court erred in refusing to direct a verdict
for the plaintiff, leaving to the jury only the que1stion of
damages; in refusing 1Jo grant plaintiff judgment not:Jwithstanding the verdict, ~and the Court erred in its instructions to the jury.

The Supreme Court should reveTSe ·and should direct
the Trial Court to submit only the question of damages on
a new trial, unless the Court itseU can fix the plaintiff's
damages from the undisputed evidence offered.
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